Several authors have shown how representations of the enemy can influence the practice of war (and vice versa). From this perspective, for example, an important set of studies has documented how racist and animalizing representations of the other contributed to fashion the “culture of violence” which characterized the Western way of war during the colonial wars and both world wars.
Parallel to this, another set of authors has made the point that consent for violence does not only take root in negative representations but, also, in more subtle dynamics of dehumanization such as bureaucratic reasoning, the routinization of violence, “technostrategic” language, mechanization, etc. Although it puts an equal emphasis on the question of representation, this second literature partly contradicts the first as it underlines that one does not need to hate or despise one’s enemy in order to feel able to kill him. Reification is sufficient and it is achieved perfectly - so the argument goes - when one fails to recognize the other as an alter-ego.
Finally, a third constellation of research has taken a completely different stance and pointed out that, in some cases, consent for violence goes along with some extreme forms of identification with the opponent. J. Bourke observed such a phenomenon in her “intimate history of war” based on the narratives of war veterans. Far from de-humanizing their opponents, these war veterans pictured the latter as their exact alter-egos. Bourke analyzed this discursive practice as a way of displaying one’s agency, as well as a consequence of the esthetization of violence in popular culture and in the mainstream media. When war becomes beautiful, Bourke argues, violence can take place outside of all de-humanizing patterns.
Whereas the nexus representation/violence has been well documented concerning former wars, we know little about how this complex dialectic operates in contemporary ones. This international conference aims at shedding some light on this blind spot by focusing on those wars that have been waged by European and North-American powers since the end of the Cold War. This conference should be an opportunity to discuss, among others, the two following questions.
The first question concerns the weight of new technologies such as remote-guidance systems, computers, and precision weapons. Whereas the technical dimension of these changes has been fairly well documented, specialists diverge when assessing how they affect the representations and practice of war. Firstly, some authors have made the point that these new technologies tend to “virtualize” the representation of the enemy and, therefore, liberate violence. Secondly, others have pointed out that the quality of images tends to re-humanize the perception of the battle-field so that modern Western soldiers have become unable to make sense of their violent actions (see the alleged cases of PTSD among drone operators). In other words, the question of the actual effect of new technologies upon the representations of the “war theatre” remains open to discussion.
The second question concerns the weight of the new public representations of the enemy. Since the end of the Cold War, two justification discourses have dominated the Western war rhetoric: the “war on terror” and the “humanitarian war”. Those discourses have gone along with new denomination of the enemy such as the “terrorist”, the “jihadist”, the “war criminal”, etc. As pointed out by many authors, those denominations introduce a shift from a rather “political” towards a more juridical/moral framing of enmity. To put it simply, the notion of enmity no longer refers to this remote other which threatens the political community from the outside (the hostis in C. Schmitt’s terms). Rather, the enemy is this person – whether distant or not – which infringes ethical norms and/or international humanitarian law (IHL).
Although they agree on this general observation, specialists diverge (again) when assessing its concrete implications. To begin with, some liberal scholars have suggested that this discursive shift has materialized, on the Western side, in a more “humane” way of waging war. They point out, for instance, that Western military organizations have introduced “codes of ethics” and “rules of engagement” which translate IHL into concrete action principles. Parallel to this, they argue that the new technologies of war – in particular the so called “precision weapons” – make possible what IHL dictates, namely a greater distinction between combatants and civilians and a greater control of violence.
In spite of its arguments, this view has been criticized by scholars who point out that Western countries have invented juridical and discursive stratagems – such as the notions of “unlawful combatant” or “collateral damage” – in order to bypass all the norms they put forward in their beautiful “codes of ethics”. Parallel to this, those critical scholars observe that the aforementioned images – the “terrorist”, the “jihadist”, the “war criminal” – are as demonizing and reifying as those which populated the Western imaginary during both world wars (the “boche”, the “Franzmann”, the Nazi, etc.). More generally speaking, they argue - following Schmitt, Adorno and others - that “violence in the name of civilization reveals its own barbarism, even as it 'justifies' its own violence by presuming the barbaric subhumanity of the other against whom that violence is waged” (J. Butler).